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Abstract
The growing prospect of deep reinforcement learning (DRL) being used in cyber-physical systems
has raised concerns around safety and robustness of autonomous agents. Recent work on generating
adversarial attacks have shown that it is computationally feasible for a bad actor to fool a DRL policy
into behaving sub optimally. Although certain adversarial attacks with specific attack models have been
addressed, most studies are only interested in off-line optimization in the data space (e.g., example fitting,
distillation). This paper introduces a Meta-Learned Advantage Hierarchy (MLAH) framework that is
attack model-agnostic and more suited to reinforcement learning, via handling the attacks in the decision
space (as opposed to data space) and directly mitigating learned bias introduced by the adversary. In
MLAH, we learn separate sub-policies (nominal and adversarial) in an online manner, as guided by a
supervisory master agent that detects the presence of the adversary by leveraging the advantage function
for the sub-policies. We demonstrate that the proposed algorithm enables policy learning with significantly
lower bias as compared to the state-of-the-art policy learning approaches even in the presence of heavy
state information attacks. We present algorithm analysis and simulation results using popular OpenAI
Gym environments.
1 Introduction
Real applications of cyber-physical systems that utilize learning techniques are already abundant such as smart
buildings [23], intelligent transportation networks [19], and intelligent surveillance and reconnaissance [1]. In
such systems, Reinforcement Learning (RL) [24, 25] is becoming a more attractive formulation for control of
complex and highly non-linear systems. The application of Deep Learning (DL) has pushed recent advances in
RL, namely Deep RL (DRL) [14, 15, 26]. Particularly in 3D continuous control tasks, DL is an indispensable
tool due to its ability to generalize high dimensional state-action spaces in Policy Optimization algorithms [10],
[9]. Notable variance reduction and trust-region optimization strategies have only furthered the performance
and stability of DRL controllers [21].
Although DL is generally useful for these control problems, DL has inherent vulnerabilities in the way
that even very small perturbations in state inputs can result in significant loss in policy learning performance.
This becomes a very reasonable cause for concern when contemplating DRL controllers in real-world tasks
where there exist, not only environmental uncertainty, but perhaps adversarial actors that aims to fool a DRL
agent into making a sub-optimal decision. During policy learning, information perturbation can be generally
thought of as a bias that can prevent the the agent from effectively learning the desired policy. Previous
attempts in mitigating adversarial attacks have been successful against specific attack models, however, such
robust training strategies are typically off-line (e.g., using augmented datasets [12]) and may fail to adapt
to different attacker strategies in an online fashion. Recently [11] has taken a model-agnostic approach by
predicting future states, however it may be susceptible to multiple consecutive attacks.
Contributions: In this paper, we consider a policy learning problem where there are periods of adversarial
attacks (via corrupting state inputs) when the agent is continuously learning in its environment. Our main
objective is online mitigation of the bias introduced into the nominal policy by the attack. We only consider
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Table 1: Comparisons with different robust adversarial RL methods
Method Online Adaptive Attack-model agnostic Mitigation
VFAS [11] 3 7 3 3
ARDL [12] 7 7 7 3
MLAH [This paper] 3 3 3 3
Online: no offline training/retraining required, Adaptive: can adapt to a change
in attack strategy, Attack-model agnostic: assumes no specific attack model,
Mitigation : is the impact of the attack actively mitigated?
how an attack affects the return instead of optimizing the observation space. In this context, our specific
contributions are:
1. Algorithm We propose a new hierarchal meta-learning framework, MLAH that can effectively detect
and mitigate the impacts of adversarial state information attacks in a attack-model agnostic manner,
using only the advantage observation.
2. Analysis: Based on a temporal expectation definition, we analyze the performance of a single mapping
policy and our proposed multi-policy mapping. Visitation frequency estimates leads us to obtaining a
new pessimistic lower bound for TRPO and variants.
3. Implementation: We implement the framework in widely utilized Gym benchmarks [2]. It is shown
that MLAH is able to learn minimally biased polices under frequent attacks by learning to identify the
adversaries presence in the return.
Although we mention several relevant techniques on learning with adversaries, we only contrast methodologies
in table 1 that aim to mitigate adversarial attacks, as other papers [16], [17] do not claim to do so. We
compare our results with the state-of-the-art PPO [22] that is sufficiently robust to uncertainties to understand
the gain from multi-policy mapping.
Related work: Attacks on deep neural networks and mitigation strategies have only recently been studied
primarily for supervised classification problems. These attacks are most commonly formulated as first order
gradient-based attacks, first seen as FGSM by Goodfellow et al [6]. These gradient based perturbation attacks
have proven to be effective in misclassification, with the corrupted input often being indistinguishable from the
original. The same principle applies to DRL agents, which can drastically affect the agent performance and
bias the policy learning process. The authors in [7] showed a threat model that considered adversaries capable
of dramatically degrading performance even with small adversarial perturbations without human perception.
Three new attacks for different distance metrics were introduced in [3] in finding adversarial examples on
defensively distilled networks. The authors in [8] introduced three new dimensions about adversarial attacks
and used the policy’s value function as a guide for when to inject perturbations. Interestingly, it has been seen
that training DRL agents on designed adversarial perturbations can improve robustness against general model
uncertainties [17], [16]. The adversarial robust policy learning algorithm [13] was introduced to leverage active
computation of physically-plausible adversarial examples in the training period to enable robust performance
with either random or adversarial input perturbations. Another robust DRL algorithm, EPOpt- for robust
policy search algorithm [18] was proposed to find a robust policy using the source distribution. Note that the
recently mentioned methods do not aim to mitigate adversarial attacks at all, but intentionally bias the agent
to perform better for model uncertainties.
2 Preliminaries and Problem Formulation
In this paper, we consider a finite-horizon discounted Markov decision processes (MDP), where each MDP
mi is defined by a tuple M = (S,A,P, r, γ, ρ0) where S is a finite set of states, A is a finite set of actions, P
is a mapping function that signifies the transition probability distribution, i.e., S ×A×S → R, r is a reward
function S → R with respect to a given state and r ∈ [rmin, rmax], ρ0 is a distribution of the initial states
and γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discounted factor. The finite-horizon expected discounted reward R(pi) following a policy
pi is defined as follows:
R(pi) = Es0,a0,...
[ T∑
t=0
γtr(st)
]
(1)
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where s0 ∼ ρ0(s0), at ∼ pii(at|st), st+1 ∼ P(st+1|st, at). We want to maximize this discounted reward sum by
optimizing a policy pi : S → A map, discussed next.
2.1 Trust Region Optimization for Parameterized Policies
For more complex 3D control problems, policy optimization has been proven to be the state-of-the-art
approach. A multi-step policy optimization scheme presented in [21] dually maximizes the improvement
(Advantage function) of the new policy while penalizing the change between the old and new policy described
by a statistical distance, namely the Kullback Liebler divergence. For continuous control policy optimization
a variant of the advantage function is often used being the Generalized Advantage Function (GAE) from [20],
which is parameterized by γ and λ where V (st) is the value function. Intuitively, GAE attempts to balance
the trade-off between bias and variance in the advantage estimate by introducing the controlled parameter
λ. We will use this in policy optimization as well as a method for temporal state abstraction later in the
proposed algorithm.
AGAE,t = ζt + (γλ)ζt+1 + ...+ ...(γλ)T−t+1ζT−1 (2)
where ζt = rt + γV (st+1)− V (st), γ, λ ∈ [0, 1].
2.2 Meta-Learned Hierarchies
Figure 1: A meta learning hierarchy similar
to MLSH in [5]. The master is tasked with
choosing a sub policy to maximize return in
the current MDP mi.
As a basis for our proposed MLAH framework, we consider
a task with multiple objectives or latent states. In this con-
text, we define a finite set of MDPs M:{m0,m,1 , · · · ,mn},
where an MDP mi, i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n} is sampled for learning
at time t. There exists a set of corresponding sub-policies
Π : {pi0, pi1, · · · , pin} which may individually be used at any
instant. We then have M → R and define a joint hierarchal
objective forM composed of sub-policies:
R(Π) = Es0,pi0,m0...
[ T∑
t=0
γtr(st)|mi, pii
]
(3)
Every mi can be thought of as a unique objective in the same
state-action space. In our case, the RL agent is not aware of
the specific mi at time t. This could alternatively be thought
of as a partially observable MDP (POMDP), however in this
work we introduce a hierarchal RL architecture to explain the
latent state. This hierarchal framework depicted in Figure 1
has been presented in [5] as Meta-Learned Shared Hierarchies
(MLSH). pimaster describes an agent who’s task is to select the
appropriate sub-policy to maximize return. The master policy,
pimaster receives the observed reward and environment state.
This mapping is far easier to learn as apposed to re-learning each sub policy which may be re-used. Since
each mi ∈M has a different S → R mapping, this makes pimaster have a non-stationary mapping across S
which requires the parameters of pimaster to be reset on a predetermined interval.
2.3 Adversary Models
We consider adversaries that perturb the state provided to the agent at any given time instant. Formally,
Definition 1. An adversarial attack is any possible state observation perturbation that leads the agent into
incurring a sub-optimal return, which is less than the return of the learned optimal policy. In other words,
R(pi|attack) < R(pi). The adversary may only perturb the state observation channel, and not the reward
channel itself.
Note, when discussing adversarial attacks, a common practice is to mathematically define a feasible
perturbation with respect to the observation space. This work presents an alternative approach (later in the
analysis Section 4) by focusing on expected frequency of attacks only and how it realizes in the RL decision
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space. This results in a framework which is more agnostic to a specific attack-model and considers more than
just the observation (data) space. However, it is important to note that the RL agent is not aware of any
attack-model specifications.
3 Proposed Algorithms
We begin with a brief motivation to the proposed Meta-Learned Advantage Hierarchy (MLAH) algorithm.
An intelligent agent, such as a human with a set of skills, when presented with a new task, should try out one
of the known skills or policies and examine its effectiveness. When the task changes, based on the expectation
of usefulness of that skill, the agent may keep using the same skill or try another skill that may seem most
appropriate for that task. In this context, given that the agent has developed accurate expectations of its
sub-policies (skills), if the underlying task were to change at anytime, the agent may notice that the result of
its action has changed with respect to what was expected. In an RL framework, comparing the expected
return of a state to the observed return of some action is typically known as the advantage. Therefore, such
an advantage estimate can serve as a good indicator of underlying changes in a task that can be leveraged to
switch from one sub-policy to another more appropriate sub-policy.
With this motivation, we can map the current problem of learning policy under intermittent adversarial
perturbations as a meta-learning problem. As our adversarial attacks (by definition 1) create a different
state-reward map, a master policy may be able to detect an attack and help choose an appropriate sub-policy
that corresponds to the adversarial scenario. More formally, we begin with two random policies that are meant
to represent the two distinct partially observable conditions in our MDP, nominal states and adversarial
perturbed states. One may begin by pre-training pinom in isolation seeing only nominal experiences. Since we
can not assume or simulate the adversary, typically it is not possible to pre-train piadv and it must be left to
pimaster to identify this alternative mapping. For each episode, we begin by collecting a trajectory of length
T, allowing pimaster at every time step (or on an interval) to select a sub-policy to act based on the advantage
coordinate observed. The advantage for pimaster, represented by At, can be calculated using only the previous
state-reward or it can be computed as a generalized estimate over the past h time-steps as a rolling window.
At =
[
AGAE,t−h|pinom, AGAE,t−h|piadv
] ∈ R2 (4)
amaster,t = pi∗,t = argmax
a
Est,pii,mi...
[ T∑
t=0
γtr(st, a)|mi
]
∈ {pinom, piadv} (5)
(a) Adversary interaction model (b) MLAH framework
Figure 2: a) Illustration of the adversarial attack mechanism: corrupting the state observation, by injecting
a perturbation  before it reaches the agent, no perturbation in the reward signal. b) MLAH architecture:
while similar to MLSH, key differences are: 1) master policy only observes the advantage of the sub-policy as
a state and 2) only two sub-polices (nominal/adversarial) considered.
Observing the advantage over states and actions can be justified philosophically and has technical benefits
when compared to other temporal state abstraction techniques that may be used to estimate the latent
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condition (RNN, LSTM). Although this mapping has potential to be noisy as the advantage can be trajectory
dependent, it is static across the multiple sub-policies as opposed to a state-policy selection mapping which
must be re-learned with every change in the latent condition.
Algorithm 1: MLAH
Input : pinom and piadv sub-policies parameterized by θnom and θadv; Master policy pimaster with
parameter vector φ.
1 Initialize θnom, θadv, φ
2 for pre-training iterations [optional] do
3 Train pinom and θnom on only nominal experiences.
4 end
5 for learning life-time do
6 for Time steps t to t+ T do
7 Compute At over sub-policies (see eq. 4)
8 select sub-policy to take action with pimaster using At as observations
9 end
10 Estimate all AGAE for pinom, piadv over T
11 Estimate all AGAE for pimaster over T with respect to At observations
12 Optimize θnom based on experiences collected from pinom
13 Optimize θadv based on experiences collected from piadv
14 Optimize φ based on all experiences with respect to At observations
15 end
Advantage map as an effective metric to detect adversary: To fool an RL agent into taking an
alternative action, an adversary may use the policy network to compute a perturbation [6]. For attack
mitigation, the RNN-based visual-foresight method [11] is practical, considering the predicted policy distance
from the chosen policy. However, it was reported [11] that such a scheme can be fooled with a series of likely
state perturbations. However in MLAH, even if the adversary could compute a series of likely states to fool
the agent, the advantage would still be affected and the master agent may detect the attack. The adversary
would have to consecutively fool the agent with a state that would be expected to give an equally bad reward.
This constraint would make the perturbation especially hard or infeasible to compute. We do acknowledge
however that this method is slightly delayed such that the agent has to experience an off-trajectory reward
before it can detect the adversary presence and may also have to observe long attack periods before learning
the advantage mapping.
4 Analysis of Bias Mitigation and Policy Improvement
Here we present analysis to show that the proposed MLAH framework reduces bias in the value function
baseline under adversarial attacks. We then show how reducing bias is inherently beneficial for policy learning
(improvement in expected reward lower bound compared to the state-of-the-art as presented in [21]) in the
presence of adversaries. In order to estimate the expected value learned by a policy, we consider a first-order
stochastic transition model (from nominal-0 to adversary-1 and vice versa) for the temporal profile of the
attack as follows:
P =
[
p0|0 p1|0
p0|1 p1|1
]
=
[
m 1−m
n 1− n
]
This defines a Markov chain (pb|a denotes the probability transitioning from a to b). Let the stationary
distribution for this Markov chain be denoted by, v = [p0, p1] that satisfies v = vP . Therefore,
p0 =
n
1−m+ n, p1 =
1−m
1−m+ n (6)
which describes the long term expectation of visiting a nominal or adversarial state. As discussed in the
preliminaries, trajectory experiences are handled with a distinct policy and value network when the adversarial
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attack is present. As the condition is perceived by the master agent, we can define two independent MDPs
separately, i.e., one given a nominal state (p∼|0) and another given the perturbed state due to the adversary
(p∼|1). With this setup, we present an assumption as follows:
Assumption 1. Long term expectation of visiting a nominal state is higher than that of adversarial state,
i.e., for the stochastic transition model P , n < m.
Let Es∼S|0V (s) be the expected discounted reward over states S given that the policy only sees nominal
conditions (m = 1). Similarly, let Es∼S|1V (s) be the expected discounted reward for the policy when it sees
the adversarial states (m = 0, n = 0) alone. We simplify the notations as follows: Es∼S|0V (s) = V0 and
Es∼S|1V (s) = V1 as two value primitives.
According to definition of the adversary (Definition 1), we have V1 < V0 as a successful adversarial attack
leads to a sub-optimal return. We can now compare the expected discounted return for the unconditioned
and conditioned learning scheme. Here, the unconditioned scheme refers to the learning scheme of a classical
DRL agent with one policy. In this case, the expected discounted reward under adversarial attacks can be
expressed as:
Eunc,s∼SV (s) = V0p0 + V1p1 = V0
n
1−m+ n + V1
1−m
1−m+ n (7)
On the other hand, the conditioned schemes refer to the two sub-policies (one given the nominal state and
other given the adversarial state) based on the proposed MLAH framework. In this context, the expected
discounted reward conditioned on the nominal state under adversarial attacks can be expressed as:
Econ,s∼S|0V (s) = V0p0|0 + V1p1|0 = V0m+ V1(1−m) (8)
We now provide a lemma to compare the unconditioned and conditioned (given a nominal state) expected
discounted rewards.
Lemma 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Eunc,s∼SV (s) < Econ,s∼S|0V (s).
See the proof in the Supplementary material.
We next discuss different lower bounds of the expected discounted rewards for the conditioned and
unconditioned policies. We begin with defining the observed bias in the state value for both the conditioned
and unconditioned policies by comparing the expected discounted reward to the original nominal value
primitive V0. Then, we have,
δcon|0 = V0 − Econ,s∼S|0V (s) = (1−m)(V0 − V1), δunc = V0 − Eunc,s∼SV (s) = (1−m)(V0 − V1)1−m+ n
With this setup, we present the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let Assumption 1 hold. δcon|0 < δunc.
The proof is straightforward using Lemma 1 (see Supplementary material).
In this context, we express V0 = Econ,s∼S|0V (s) + δcon|0 and V0 = Eunc,s∼SV (s) + δunc in a general way
as: V (s) = Vˆ (s) + δ, where δ is the observed bias in the state value. According to the definition of advantage
function in Eq. 2, letting λ = 0, we have Api(st, at) = rt + γV (st+1)− V (st). Substituting V (s) = Vˆ (s) + δ
into the last equation yields
Api(st, at) = rt + γVˆ (st+1)− Vˆ (st) + γδs,t+1 − δs,t = Aˆpi(st, at) + γδs,t+1 − δs,t (9)
where Aˆpi(st, at) is the actual advantage function. While Lemma 2 shows that δ is reduced due to conditioning
in our proposed framework, we note that the observed bias in the expected discounted reward can be different
from that in the state value due to the complex and uncertain environment. Following the definition of the
expected discounted reward in [21], recalling V (s) = Vˆ (s) + δ, the relationship between true and actual
expected discounted reward is: R(pi) = Es∼pi[Vˆpi(st, at) + δ] = Rˆ(pi) + δˆ, where δˆ is observed bias in the
expected discounted reward. We denote the observed bias in the reward for the unconditioned and conditioned
cases as: δˆunc and δˆcon|0. Let ∆δˆ = δˆunc − δˆcon|0 and ∆δ = δunc − δcon|0. We are now ready to discuss the
lower bounds of the expected discounted rewards for the conditioned and unconditioned schemes. Before
that, based on [21], we introduce the maximum total variation divergence for any two different policies and
use α to denote it for the rest of the analysis. We also first present one proposition to show the relationship
between the actual expected discounted reward and its approximation. It is an extension of Theorem 1 in [21],
which helps characterize the main claim in the paper.
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Proposition 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then the following inequality hold:
Rˆ(pinew) ≥ Lˆpiold(pinew)−
4˜γα2
(1− γ)2 (10)
where pinew indicates the new policy, piold indicates the current policy, Lˆpiold(pinew) = Lpiold(pinew) + δ − δˆ,
Lpiold(pinew) is the approximation of R(pinew), i.e., Lpiold(pinew) = R(piold)+
∑
s ρpiold(s)
∑
a pinew(a|s)Apiold(s, a),
ρ is the discounted visitation frequencies as similarly defined in [21], ˜ satisfies the following relationship
˜ =

maxs,a|Aˆpi(s, a)|+ (γ − 1)δ, if Aˆpi(s, a) ≥ (1− γ)δ.
−maxs,a|Aˆpi(s, a)|+ (1− γ)δ, if 0 < Aˆpi(s, a) < (1− γ)δ.
maxs,a|Aˆpi(s, a)|+ (1− γ)δ, if Aˆpi(s, a) ≤ 0
(11)
See the proof in the supplementary material. We then arrive at the following result to show that using
the conditioned policy allows to achieve a higher lower bound of expected discounted reward.
Proposition 2. If ∆δˆ < C∆V , where C ≥ (m−n)(1−m)(4γα2+1−γ)(1−m+n)(1−γ) and ∆V = V0 − V1, then the conditioned
policy has a higher lower bound of expected discounted reward compared to that of the unconditioned policy.
Detail development of the proposition along with the proof is presented in the Supplementary material.
Remark 1. Proposition 1 suggests that under a certain condition, using the conditioned policy can improve
the lower bound of the expected discounted return over the unconditioned policy. Intuitively, the condition
demands the adversary to be sufficiently intelligent in order to have a large enough value for ∆V .
5 Experimental Results
In order to justify the theoretical implications of bias reduction using a conditioned policy optimization, we
implemented the proposed framework introduced in Section 3 with a selection of simple adversary models.
Because the meta-learned framework has many moving parts and can be subject to instabilities, we first
consider a case where the master agent is an oracle in determining the presence of an adversary. Then we
consider the advantage-based adversary detection by the master agent.
5.1 Experimental Setup
For all experiments, we use the proximal clipped objective L(θ)CLIP+V F from [22] instead of a constrained
trust region optimization in accordance with recent results showing similar performance and ease of imple-
mentation. We use the same optimization for the master agent, although we acknowledge this may not be the
best method for only two action choices (nominal or adversarial), we propose this to generalize to an arbitrary
number of sub-polices. In every example, training denotes the agent acting with an -greedy exploration
policy with adversarial attacks. Simultaneously, we run an evaluation which executes a deterministic actions
with the same policy, without adversarial attacks, hence obtain much higher return values. For the examples
shown, we introduce the adversary on a fixed interval (e.g., 5000 with adversary, 10000 without). During that
period, the adversary perturbs the state at every time step. For page limit constraints, PPO parameters used
in experiments such as deep network size and actor-batches can be found in the supplementary material.
5.1.1 Stochastic l∞-bounded Attacks
In this paper, for the purpose of experiment, we consider an attacker model that has the ability to perturb state
information from the environment before it reaches the agent. Since gradient-based attacks for continuous
action policies have not been thoroughly studied, the adversarial agent will not optimize it’s attack for the
agent’s policy, but only sample the perturbation size and direction from a defined uniform distribution U(a, b)
about the current state s = [s0, s1, · · · , sn]. This results in an attack where si, adversary = si + U(a, b) where
the perturbation is bounded by the l∞ norm so that ∀si ∈ s max
i
|si − si, adversary| ≤ attack. We find that
this naive attack is effective enough to decrease the return of a policy. We specifically utilize white-noise
attacks where a = −b as well as bias attacks, where a 6= b and a < b.
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Table 2: Performance evaluation of Oracle-MLAH
Normalized avg. training return Normalized avg. evaluation return
m/n Vanilla Oracle-MLAH Vanilla Oracle-MLAH
1.0/− 0.96± 0.03 0.96± 0.03 1.0 1.0
0.995/0.005 0.238± .082 0.553± 0.242 0.471± 0.051 0.99± 0.001
0.95/0.05 0.612± .08 0.677± 0.149 0.644± 0.078 0.99± 0.001
0.8/0.2 0.613± 0.043 0.728± 0.063 0.539± 0.023 0.994± 0.165
0.5/0.5 0.749± 0.093 0.764± 0.078 0.787± 0.010 0.948± 0.086
Comparison of the returns of Vanilla PPO and Oracle-MLAH under attacks over 40 policy opti-
mization iterations with 1σ uncertainty bounds. The training return uses a stochastic policy for
exploration and evaluation acts deterministically. The evaluation bias for the Oracle-MLAH remains
substantially lower over all attack severity levels. Note when m = n, training returns are very similar
as predicted by Eq. 8.
5.2 Adversarial Bias Reduction with MLAH
We begin by examining an RL environment where the master agent is asked to select the policy that
corresponds to the current condition, i.e., nominal or adversarial. We acknowledge that this "policy" may
not be the optimal master policy since a game may not be perfectly Markov. However, we find that this is
sufficient to examine the policy improvement in some Openai Mujoco control environments [2].
Figure 3: Results of Oracle-MLAH and Vanilla PPO applied to the InvertedPendulum-v2 game with repeatedly
scheduled attacks for 5000 time steps and then off for 10000, displaying a 1σ bound. Left: Case study
with an extreme bias attack spanning the entire state-space. Vanilla policy is unable to resolve the correct
mapping due to large disturbances in the state information, while MLAH improves nearly monotonically.
Right: Case study with a weaker bias attack, Vanilla agent still struggles.
The returns shown in Table 2 and Figure 3 for long and intermittent bias attacks (large m and small
n) clearly demonstrate the benefit of using distinct policies for nominal and adversarial states respectively.
According to eq. 8, this attack condition produces the largest difference in bias between conditioned and
unconditioned policies. As a policy can only solve for one state-action mapping and there are clearly two
separate MDP state-reward distributions existing across time, a singly policy has no choice, but to optimize
over the mean of these two distributions. Often times this results in not developing a useful policy for either
condition as shown in figure 3. Enabling the use of multiple polices in this intermittent attack case allows the
agent to optimize for both mappings, even learning to mitigate the reduced return during the adversarial
attack. More simulation results using Open Gym environments such as MountainCarContinuous-v0 and
Hopper-v2 [2] are included in the supplementary material.
It can be seen in table 2 that as the switching expectations between nominal and adversarial states
rise, the unconditioned (Vanilla) policy actually performs increasingly well, but still less than that of the
conditioned (MLAH) policy. This is perhaps because the switching is quick enough to map the scenario to
one state-reward distribution, which is favorable for a single policy agent.
As anticipated by the analysis, when m = n, the training performances of both policies approach a similar
value, however the conditioned MLAH agent was able to maintain a nearly unbiased evaluation return. This
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may be an artifact of the environment or adversary, which is relatively simple and unintelligent. Over longer
attack periods, it may be unrealistic to expect the return to behave according to the stationary distribution
expectation because the average resolves on a longer time scale than policy optimization.
Figure 4: Master agent’s performance in learning from two random policies to decide which to employ to
maximize the reward of InvertedPendulum-v2 with bounded 5000 on, 10000 off bias attacks. The master
agent is not given any information on which states are perturbed by the adversary. After initial learning, the
policy choices clearly diverge during the attack intervals with few exceptions.
Next we put our master agent to the test, using the relative advantage coordinate mappings. This
formulation is a novel alternative to previous meta-learned hierarchies which are non-stationary and need
to be reset over time [5]. The relative advantage mapping is stationary across multiple MDPs under
certain conditions. In order for the master agent to arrive at correct advantage-policy mapping, the policies
themselves must also optimize to produce better advantage estimates in this expectation maximization (EM)
type algorithm. This makes it challenging to produce a stable learning sequence of polices and advantage
mappings. However, this mapping can be learned from “nothing” if an adversary creates a strong enough
presence by altering the state-reward mapping (by Definition 1). This optimization process is explained in
more depth in the supplementary material. Depending on whether the nominal policy is pre-trained and the
effectiveness of the adversary, the meta agent can reliably use each policy during the respective conditions.
As seen in Figure 4, an adversary is introduced in an intermittent manner and the master agent has two
random sub-polices at its disposal. The agent optimizes to use one policy for the nominal and the other for
the adversarial conditions to optimize its reward. The policy-selection results in Figure 4 may resemble a
Bayesian non-parametric latent state estimator [4]. However, being entirely in the context of RL, MLAH is
unique and uses the advantage observation and a meta-learning objective to form a belief over the latent
conditions.
6 Conclusions
We have discussed a new MLAH framework for handling adversarial attacks in an online manner specifically
in the context of RL. This framework is attack-model agnostic and presents a general way of examining
adversarial attacks in the temporal domain. Analyzing the hierarchical policy MLAH in this way, we can
show that under certain conditions, the return lower-bound is improved when compared to a single policy
agent. In future research, we aim to improve the stability of MLAH by optimizing the master agent function,
perhaps using a more simple method to regress the advantage space. We will also attempt to extend MLAH
to a more general framework for decision problems with multiple time-varying objectives.
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7 Supplementary Materials
7.1 Additional Analysis
This section presents the analysis for all of lemmas and propositions and additional analysis.
Transition Mechanism of Adversary MDP:
Figure 5: Assumed mechanism (only for analysis purpose) for nominal to adversary state transitions: p0|0
signifies the probability that a nominal state transits to another nominal state; p1|0 signifies the probability
that a nominal state transits to an adversarial state; p0|1 signifies the probability that an adversarial state
transits to a nominal state; p1|1 signifies the probability that an adversarial state transits to another adversarial
state
The rest of the analysis in this section is based on the above transition mechanism.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. Based on the definitions of Eunc,s∼SV (s) and Econ,s∼S|0V (s), we have
Eunc,s∼SV (s)− Econ,s∼S|0V (s) = V0 n1−m+ n + V1
1−m
1−m+ n − V0m− V1(1−m)
With some mathematical manipulation, we have
Eunc,s∼SV (s)− Econ,s∼S|0V (s) = (V0 − V1)(n−m)(1−m)1−m+ n (12)
As V1 < V0 and n < m, then we get the desired results.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Proof. As V1 < V0, then V0 − V1 > 0. Based on the definitions of δcon|0 and δunc, and Lemma 1, the desired
result is immediately obtained.
The following analysis is for establishing the relationship between the true and actual expected discounted
rewards.
For completeness, we rewrite or redefine some definitions here to characterize the analysis. We denote
by Vˆ (s) the actual state value of the learned policy (i.e., the conditioned or unconditioned). Define the
relationship between the true state value and actual state value as:
V (s) = Vˆ (s) + δ
which can be adaptive to the unconditioned or conditioned policy by substituting different bias. δ is the
observed bias in the state value. We also denote by pi and p˜i the current policy and the new policy. According
to the definition of advantage function in Eq. 2, letting λ = 0, we have
Api(st, at) = rt + γV (st+1)− V (st)
Substituting V (s) = Vˆ (s) + δ into the last equation yields
Api(st, at) = rt + γVˆ (st+1)− Vˆ (st) + γδs,t+1 − δs,t = Aˆpi(st, at) + δs,t+1(γ − 1) (13)
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where Aˆpi(st, at) is the actual advantage function under a learned policy. Based on the definition of expected
discounted reward in [21], we have
R(pi) = Es∼pi
[
Vpi(st, at)
]
(14)
which results in the relationship between the true and actual expected discounted rewards as follows
R(pi) = Es∼pi
[
Vˆpi(st, at) + δ
]
= Rˆ(pi) + δˆ (15)
where δˆ is the observed bias in the expected discounted reward. It is immediately obtained that corresponding
to different learned policies, δˆ is not the same. In this context, we define δˆunc as the observed bias in the
expected discounted reward caused by the unconditioned policy and δˆcon|0 as the observed bias in the expected
discounted reward caused by the conditioned policy. Now we analyze the expected discounted reward of the
new policy p˜i in terms over the current policy pi in order to know the difference between different policies
during the learning process. Following [21], we define the expected discounted reward of p˜i as follows
R(p˜i) = R(pi) + Es,a∼pˆi
[ T∑
t=0
γtApi(st, at)
]
(16)
Hence, combining Eq. 13 and Eq. 16 we obtain the expected discounted reward of the new policy p˜i with
respect to the expected discounted reward of the current policy pi, the actual advantage and the observed
bias in the state value.
R(p˜i) = R(pi) + Es,a∼p˜i
[ T∑
t=0
γtAˆpi(st, at)
]
+ Es,a∼p˜i
[ T∑
t=0
γt(γδs,t+1 − δs,t)
]
(17)
As we use the same neural networks to estimate the actual state values, we assume that in Eq. 17 the
expectation of bias δs,t given the state s can be treated equally as constant, represented by δ for convenience
of analysis. Therefore, by substituting Eq. 15 the last equality becomes as follows
R(p˜i) = Rˆ(pi) + δˆ + Es,a∼p˜i
[ T∑
t=0
γtAˆpi(st, at)
]
− δ = Rˆ(p˜i) + δˆ − δ (18)
which shows the true expected discounted reward of the policy p˜i with respect to its actual expected discounted
reward Rˆ(p˜i), the observed bias in the expected discounted reward, δˆ, and the observed bias in the state
value, δ.
For the rest of analysis, we follow the similar analysis procedure presented [21] and for convenience we
denote by piold the current policy pi and by pinew the new policy p˜i. Following [21], we first rewrite Eq. 16 as
the following equation
R(pinew) = R(piold) +
∑
s
T∑
t=0
γtP(st = s|pinew)
∑
a
pinew(a|s)Apiold(s, a)
= R(piold) +
∑
s
ρpinew(s)
∑
a
pinew(a|s)Apiold(s, a)
(19)
where ρpinew is the discounted visitation frequencies as similarly defined in [21]. Then we define an approxi-
mation of R(pinew) as
Lpiold(pinew) = R(piold) +
∑
s
ρpiold(s)
∑
a
pinew(a|s)Apiold(s, a) (20)
due to the complex dependence of ρpinew on pinew. Similarly, according to Eq. 18 we have
Lpiold(pinew) = Lˆpiold(pinew) + δˆ − δ (21)
13
For completeness, we state the main theorem from [21] to guarantee the monotonic improvement. Before that,
we need to define the total variation divergence for two different discrete probability distributions q, o, i.e.,
DTV (q||o) = 12
∑
i |qi − oi|, based on which, we define DmaxTV (piold, pinew) = maxsDTV (piold(·|s)||pinew(·|s)).
Following [21], we state the main theorem from [21] to guarantee the monotonic improvement.
Theorem 1. (Theorem 1 in [21]) Let α = DmaxTV (piold, pinew). Then the following bound holds:
R(pinew) ≥ Lpiold(pinew)−
4γα2
(1− γ)2 (22)
where  = maxs,a|Api(s, a)|.
With this, we arrive at the following proposition to demonstrate the relationship between the actual
expected discounted reward and its approximation.
Proposition 1 Let α = DmaxTV (piold, pinew). Then the following inequality hold:
Rˆ(pinew) ≥ Lˆpiold(pinew)−
4˜γα2
(1− γ)2 (23)
where ˜ satisfies the following relationship
˜ =

maxs,a|Aˆpi(s, a)|+ (γ − 1)δ, if Aˆpi(s, a) ≥ (1− γ)δ.
−maxs,a|Aˆpi(s, a)|+ (1− γ)δ, if 0 < Aˆpi(s, a) < (1− γ)δ.
maxs,a|Aˆpi(s, a)|+ (1− γ)δ, if Aˆpi(s, a) ≤ 0
(24)
Proof. Combining Eq. 21 with the proof of Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 in [21], we can arrive at the similar form of
conclusion as shown in Theorem 1. The difference between the conclusion in Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 is
when we consider the actual expected discounted reward, the ˜ value is different from the  value in Eq. 22.
We next discuss the new value for ˜. As the advantage function has the following relationship
Api(st, at) = Aˆpi(st, at) + δ(γ − 1)
Then, ˜ = maxs,a|Aˆpi(s, a) + (γ − 1)δ|. Since δ > 0 and γ − 1 < 0, we need to discuss the sign of
Aˆpi(s, a) + (γ − 1)δ. Three cases are discussed as below:
1. When Aˆpi(s, a) + (γ − 1)δ ≥ 0 such that Aˆpi(s, a) ≥ (1− γ)δ, ˜ = maxs,a|Aˆpi(s, a)|+ (γ − 1)δ,
2. When Aˆpi(s, a) + (γ − 1)δ ≤ 0 and if 0 < Aˆpi(s, a) < (1− γ)δ, ˜ = −maxs,a|Aˆpi(s, a)|+ (1− γ)δ,
3. When Aˆpi(s, a) + (γ − 1)δ ≤ 0 and if Aˆpi(s, a) ≤ 0, ˜ = maxs,a|Aˆpi(s, a)|+ (1− γ)δ,
which completes the proof.
Remark 2. The condition Aˆpi(s, a) ≥ (1− γ)δ above may seem constrictive, but it can hold. If we consider
that in order to achieve a positive advantage, the value function must be biased to underestimate the reward
at the beginning. Therefore, the value function bias itself needs to be biased by at least δ(1 − γ) at the
beginning. Hence, for any δ > 0, we have δ(1− γ) < δ, which is always true as 0 < γ < 1. One can arrive at
the same result for δ < 0 when Aˆpi(s, a) ≤ (1− γ)δ.
Now we will show the Proposition 1 with the condition Aˆpi(s, a) ≥ (1− γ)δ.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. For assessing the new lower bound, we have exactly accounted for the bias in both conditioned and
unconditioned policies. Therefore, according to Theorem 1, Eq. 21, and Eq. 23, we have
Lpiold(pinew)−
4γα2
(1− γ)2 =
(
Lˆpiold(pinew)
)
con|0
+ δˆcon|0 − δcon|0 −
4˜con|0γα2
(1− γ)2
=
(
Lˆpiold(pinew)
)
unc
+ δˆunc − δunc − 4˜uncγα
2
(1− γ)2
(25)
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The
(
Lˆpiold(pinew)
)
con|0
and
(
Lˆpiold(pinew)
)
unc
signify the approximation of Rˆ(pinew) in both conditioned
and unconditioned policies, respectively. Similarly, ˜con|0 and ˜unc indicate the different upper bounds
corresponding to the conditioned and unconditioned policies, respectively. Let ˆ = maxs,a|Aˆpi(s, a)| such
that we have ˆcon|0 and ˆunc for the conditioned and unconditioned policies. Due to the condition that
Aˆpi(s, a) ≥ (1− γ)δ, based on Proposition 1 we have
˜unc =
(
maxs,a|Aˆpi(s, a)|
)
unc
+ (γ − 1)δunc = ˆunc + (γ − 1)δunc (26)
and
˜con|0 =
(
maxs,a|Aˆpi(s, a)|
)
con|0
+ (γ − 1)δcon|0 = ˆcon|0 + (γ − 1)δcon|0 (27)
Hence, substituting Eq. 26 and Eq. 27 into Eq. 25, we have(
Lˆpiold(pinew)
)
con|0
+ δˆcon|0 − δcon|0 −
4ˆcon|0γα2
(1− γ)2 +
4δcon|0γα2
1− γ
=
(
Lˆpiold(pinew)
)
unc
+ δˆunc − δunc − 4ˆuncγα
2
(1− γ)2 +
4δuncγα2
1− γ
(28)
By the condition that ∆δˆ < C∆V and ∆δˆ = δˆunc − δˆcon|0, we have
δˆunc − δˆcon|0 < (m− n)(1−m)(4γα
2 + 1− γ)
(1−m+ n)(1− γ) ∆V
= ∆V (m− n)(1−m)1−m+ n
4γα2 + 1− γ
1− γ
= ∆V m− n+mn−m
2 + 1−m+m− 1
1−m+ n
4γα2 + 1− γ
1− γ
= ∆V 1−m− (1−m+ n−m+m
2 −mn)
1−m+ n
4γα2 + 1− γ
1− γ
= ∆V 1−m− (1−m)(1−m+ n)1−m+ n
4γα2 + 1− γ
1− γ
=
(
(1−m)∆V
1−m+ n − (1−m)∆V
)(
4γα2
1− γ + 1
)
(29)
According to the definition of bias for the expected discounted reward, we have
δˆunc − δˆcon|0 < (δunc − δcon|0)
(
4γα2
1− γ + 1
)
= 4γδuncα
2
1− γ −
4γδcon|0α2
1− γ + δunc − δcon|0
(30)
The last inequality yields the following relationship:
4γδcon|0α2
1− γ + δcon|0 − δˆcon|0 <
4γδuncα2
1− γ + δunc − δˆunc (31)
which results in the next inequality, combined with Eq. 28(
Lˆpiold(pinew)
)
con|0
− 4ˆcon|0γα
2
(1− γ)2 >
(
Lˆpiold(pinew)
)
unc
− 4ˆuncγα
2
(1− γ)2 (32)
which suggests that by the conditioned policy, the lower bound of expected discounted reward is higher. It
completes the proof.
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7.2 Meta Optimization of the Advantage Space
To better explain the use of the advantage coordinate space, we provide some additional illustrations of the
interesting optimization process at play. For visualization purposes, in figure 6 we simulated a value surface
with injected noise for a game in which there are two goal positions on a 2D plane, one at [−1, 0] and the
other at [1, 0]. At any moment the goal may be at only one of these positions. When we create two polices to
learn each distinct goal and value surface, we start from nothing, and the advantage space extremely noisy.
The master agent will try its best to select sub-policies given this mapping and incrementally, each policy
will become slightly better, meaning there is less bias and variance in the value function predictor. This
will then allow the master agent to select policies with even greater accuracy, in result, improving the two
value function accuracy more. One can see from this iterative process that it can hopefully achieve both an
accurate master, and high-performing distinct polices simultaneously. This is an interesting way to perform
an EM style optimization because it is only defined by a reward signal. All other optimization steps can be
derived from that single scalar signal.
Figure 6: Depicted is the visualized meta optimization process for a multi-objective game. In each frame
there are two surface, each representing the belief of the state-value map. As the map becomes more accurate,
the advantage space becomes easier to regress, which improves value accuracy and so on. One can draw
parallels to some sort of expectation maximization style algorithm.
7.3 Additional Results
In this section, we provide some additional experiments, results and illustrations that may help the reader
better understand the implications of the paper. We have tested the oracle-MLAH based protocol on several
Gym environments and of these we show MountainCarContinuous-v0 Figure 7 and Hopper-v2 Figure 8 case
studies with white noise attacks and discuss some interesting observations made in each. All experiment are
once again using the PPO clipped objective function with value prediction bonus.
7.3.1 MountainCarContinuous-v0
This experiment using the MountainCarContinuous-v0 environment was particularly insightful due to the
behavior of the bias. The Vanilla policy was able to achieve considerable reward and the difference between
it’s nominal and adversarial peaks was small. It can be noted that out of the average maximum nominal
reward of ≈ 95.0 and a minimum with adversaries ≈ 5.0, the expected biased return should have been 30.0
according to ∆V from eq. 8. This is approximately the observed average return for the Vanilla policy.
7.3.2 Hooper-v2
The Hopper-v2 environment behaved similar to others during the attacks, except that the average performance
during the attack appeared to be lower for the MLAH oracle, however MLAH oracle remained less biased in
16
Figure 7: Here we show an adversary that is implements strong stochastic white noise on the
MountainCarContinuous-v0 environment. The baseline for the adversarial transitions happens to be approxi-
mately 5.0 which makes our ∆V about 90.0 reward points. According to the approximate m and n for this
experiment, the bias should be about 60.0 reward points (30.0 return), which is approximately the mean
return for the Vanilla policy.
the nominal case. This is a curious observation that tells us that MLAH may not always mitigate the attack
as well as a single Vanilla policy (in this case PPO).
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Figure 8: Here we show an adversary that is implements strong stochastic white noise on the Hopper-
v2 environment. This environment-adversary pair is particularly interesting because it shows that the
unconditioned policy actually learned to handle the adversary more effectively than the conditioned MLAH.
However, it obviously suffers in the nominal condition, while MLAH receives significantly higher returns.
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